Train Dispatchers are the air traffic controllers of the railroads. They control the movement of trains over large track territories. This game simulates the gargantuan routing tasks a real-life dispatcher faces daily.
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It is commonplace in today's railroad operations for dispatchers to be located at a significant distance from the trackage and operations they control. For example, CSX Transportation, Inc, (CSX) dispatchers in Jacksonville, Florida, control the operations of CSX, Amtrak, and commuter rail trains throughout the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic. This does not create any additional safety risk. FRA does not mean to suggest, in the discussion of dispatch locational issues, that mere distance from the physical site of rail operations poses a safety hazard.
Currently, dispatchers located outside the United States control only very limited train movements in the United States. Specifically, the Canadian National Railway Company (CN) uses Canadian-based dispatchers to control trains operating from Ontario, Canada, into the United States on the following trackage in the United States: 1.8 miles to Detroit, Michigan; and 3 miles to Port Huron, Michigan. CN also uses Canadian-based dispatchers located in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, to control trains operating into Minnesota on 40 miles of track on the Sprague Subdivision, which accommodates 10 trains daily.1 Finally, the Eastern Maine Railway Company operates track between McAdam, New Brunswick, Canada, to Brownville Junction, Maine, 99 miles of which are in the United States. Operations on this trackage are dispatched from St. John, New Brunswick, Canada. These limited rail operations do not cover any trackage that has been designated by FRA and the Military Traffic Management Command of the Department of Defense (DOD) as vital to the national defense. In addition, there is no evidence that these extremely limited operations have adversely affected safety. No dispatchers located in Mexico control railroad operations in the United States.2
However, there is the prospect of increased use of dispatchers located outside the United States. Specifically, CP, which owns the Delaware and Hudson Railway Company (D&H), is interested in relocating from the United States to Canada dispatching functions involving the dispatching of approximately 32 D&H trains per day operating over the 546-mile D&H system in the United States. CN's previous acquisitions of the Grand Trunk Western Railroad, Inc. (GTW) (646 miles of track operated by GTW (1998 figures)), the Illinois Central Railroad Company (2591 miles of track) and the 2,500 route miles of U.S. Class II and III railroads formerly owned by the Wisconsin Central Transportation Company raise the possibility of additional extraterritorial dispatching at some future date.3 In addition, CP's earlier acquisition of the Soo Line Railroad Company also presents future exposure of the same kind. FRA is aware that the merged or consolidated railroads (other than CP in the case of D&H) disclaim (or are silent regarding) any current intention to transfer dispatching work outside the country. The railroads have the discretion, however, to act in their own best interests and are under no obligation to continue to refrain from extraterritorial dispatching, and those interests may change as circumstances change.
Under part 219, dispatchers and other safety-sensitive railroad employees located in the United States are subject to random, reasonable suspicion, return-to-duty, follow-up, and post-accident drug and alcohol testing, as well as pre-employment testing for drugs.4 See subparts B, C, D, F, and G of part 219. Post-accident testing is required for a dispatcher who is directly and contemporaneously involved in the circumstances of any train accident meeting FRA testing thresholds. See subpart C. A dispatcher found to have violated FRA's drug and alcohol rules, or who refuses to submit to testing, is required to be immediately removed from dispatching service for a nine-month period, and the railroad must follow specified procedures including return-to-duty and follow-up testing requirements before returning the dispatcher to dispatching service. See subpart B. Additionally, domestic-based employers must provide self-referral and co-worker reporting (self-policing) programs for their employees (subpart E), submit random alcohol and drug testing plans for approval by FRA (subpart G), conduct random testing under part 219 and DOT procedures found in part 40 (subpart H), submit annual reports (subpart I), and maintain program records (subpart J).5
See 49 CFR 219.201(a). Rail/highway grade crossing accidents and accidents wholly resulting from natural causes (e.g., tornado), vandalism, or trespassing are exempt from FRA post-accident testing. See 49 CFR 219.201(b). For a major train accident, all train crewmembers must be tested, but any other covered employees (e.g., dispatchers, signalmen) determined not to have had a role in the cause or severity of the accident are not to be tested. See 49 CFR 219.201(c)(2).
As a result of the safety reviews, FRA concluded that a fundamental breakdown existed in some of the basic railroad operating procedures and practices essential to maintain a safe operation, particularly in the area of dispatching. As part of the SACP process, FRA conducted a comprehensive safety audit of UP/SP's Harriman Dispatch Center, which is the railroad's main dispatching facility and which dispatches operations on approximately 95 percent of UP/SP's territory. During the initial phase of the safety audit, FRA inspectors and safety specialists spent a total of 31 days at the dispatching center observing and analyzing UP/SP dispatching practices and procedures. Later, FRA inspectors headquartered within a few miles of the dispatching center made frequent follow-up visits to the dispatching center. FRA observed inefficient and unsafe practices by supervisors and dispatchers at the dispatching center, and correctly attributed those practices to inadequate training and extreme work overload. FRA made specific recommendations, which UP/SP accepted, such as creating additional dispatch positions, realigning dispatchers' territories to better balance the workload, hiring new dispatchers, tripling the number of dispatching supervisors, making improvements to the software in the UP/SP's CAD system, and forming a working group consisting of representatives from FRA, rail labor, and UP/SP management to continually monitor and address dispatching issues that may arise.7 As a result of FRA's SACP efforts, UP/SP's safety performance recovered rapidly. During the year following FRA's dispatching initiative, UP/SP saw fatalities due to train collisions drop by 100 percent, from seven in 1997 to none in 1998. Such an immediate response could not have been effectuated without FRA's ability to obtain access to its facilities, which would not have been guaranteed if UP/SP's dispatching facilities were located outside the United States.
Another safety tool FRA has at its disposal is the safety advisory.8 Safety advisories are issued by FRA and published in the Federal Register to disseminate important information on critical safety concerns. By publishing safety advisories in the Federal Register, FRA is able to reach the entire regulated community instead of just the railroad whose actions prompted the safety advisory. Previous safety advisories have concerned problems with train control systems, train handling procedures, equipment securement procedures, and procedures for reducing the risk of damage to tracks and bridges from flash floods. For example, on December 23, 1996, FRA published a Notice of Safety Bulletin in the Federal Register (61 FR 64191) addressing recommended safety practices for Direct Train Control (DTC), an umbrella term that refers to methods of operation used by dispatchers to control train movements that are known variously as Direct Traffic Control, Track Warrant Control (TWU), Track Permit Control System (TICS), and Form D Control System (DCS), and similar means of authorizing train movements. The safety bulletin was issued as a result of FRA's investigation of a head-on collision between two freight trains operated by CSX, and included three recommended safety practices for operations in DTC territory. Although railroad compliance with safety advisories is voluntary, the effectiveness of the advisories is greatly influenced by FRA's ability to determine the nature of the railroad's responsive action through on-site inspections and the ability to issue regulations and emergency orders should the railroad refuse to abide by the safety advisory.
For example, if the host country's hours of service restrictions (if any) apply in the same manner as FRA has traditionally interpreted those of the United States (49 U.S.C. ch. 211), then those restrictions would normally apply only if the nexus to railroad safety in the host country is clear because the dispatcher controls railroad operations that occur in the host country at least at some point during his or her duty tour. Several conclusions result. First, the host country's rules would always apply to a Type 1 dispatcher (because he or she is controlling operations in the host country and thus performing service subject to those rules during each of his or her duty tours). Second, the host country's rules would apply only sometimes to a Type 2 or Type 3 dispatcher (only during the duty tours when he or she controls operations in the host country). Third, the host country's rules would never apply to a Type 4 dispatcher (because he or she does not control operations in the host country during his or her duty tour). Of course, the necessity for the Type 2 and Type 3 dispatcher to comply with the host country's rules during some of his or her duty tours might benefit the safety of United States railroad operations, but not as much as if the rules applied to all of his or her duty tours. In the case of the Type 4 dispatcher, who controls only operations in the United States and none in the host country, the probable inapplicability of the host country's safeguards against fatigue to any of his or her dispatching would mean that he or she could legally be required to work for dangerously long periods of time, which would increase the risk of human error that could lead to train accidents and train incidents in the United States. Similar typologies and scenarios could be created with respect to the dispatching centers themselves (e.g., security measures) and to other aspects of the dispatching function, such as training in the railroad company's operating rules paralleling part 217. 2ff7e9595c
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